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UEFA Squad Cost Ratio (SCR) Explained

We do the research so you don't have to.

Why are UEFA getting involved?

  • Simply because Villa are now playing in Europe and have been caught up in the UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Sustainability Regulations approved in 2022 and set live in 2023.

  • These regulations are split into three 'pillars'

    • Solvency

    • Stability

    • Cost Control

  • Solvency is a quarterly check to ensure clubs are paying their creditors on time.

  • Stability is covered by a PSR type regulation with allowable losses of €180m over three years.

  • Cost Control is covered by something called SCR. It's SCR that we cover here.

  • Clubs also need to have net positive equity in every reporting period, even if the consequence of that such as an equity injection means they fail on any of the three pillars.

    What does SCR stand for and what is it?

  • SCR is the acronym given to UEFA's squad cost ratio as defined in Annex K of the UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Sustainability Regulations

  • In essence SCR is UEFA's version of the Premier League's PSR (Profit & Sustainability Regulations) but it is only applicable to clubs active in UEFA competitions: the Champions League, the Europa League and the European Conference League

    How is SCR calculated?

  • SCR is calculated in two elements, one is the numerator 'squad cost' as defined by UEFA's own rules and the other is the denominator 'adjusted revenue' also defined by UEFA's own rules.

  • SCR is calculated over the calendar year, not the financial year.

    How does SCR differ from PSR?

  • Well firstly, UEFA have their own PSR called 'Stability requirements'. That is the second of the three UEFA pillars of which SCR is the third.

  • The 'Stability requirements' work in a very similar way to PSR but rather than a £105m aggregate loss over three seasons, UEFA allow a €180m total loss over a similar period with an extra €30m leeway available for good behaviour.

  • But whether it is PSR, SCR or Stability it is intended to do the same thing - prevent compeititiveness in the organisation's competitions ... sorry to ensure the financial stability of clubs participating in the organisation's competitions.

  • However the punishments under UEFA's regulations are quite different from those under the Premier League's PSR.

  • Whereas the risk of PSR is points deduction within a League format, that is not possible under UEFA competitions and so the punishment in SCR is entirely financial.

  • Of course both courses of action, whether directly or indirectly, utimately impose more financial instablilty on a club accused of risking a competition's economic fabric with financial instability.

  • Which is pretty daft.

  • But like PSR, SCR exists, and the affected clubs have to abide by it.

    What is included in the squad part of the squad costs?

  • UEFA are very prescriptive in exactly what and who should be included, but in simple terms:

  • Squad costs are the sum total of all benefits paid by the club, or its entities to any player that is a) male b) registered to the club at any point during the period or any player past, present or future who has received any sort of remuneration over the period as well as any head coach(es) (regardless of how they are titled).

  • Each of the above become known as a 'relevant person'.

    How is the squad cost calculated?

  • The gross income of any relevant person.

  • The employee benefits of any relevant person.

  • Any form of bonus, signing on fee, contract termination payment or settlement fee of any relevant person, in fact any sort of incentive payment you can imagine regardless of the form it takes and that includes crypto, NFTs etc.

  • Any post employment benefits of any relevant person.

  • Any image rights payments (where a contract exists between club and relevant person for this).

  • Any cost incurred by a third party for appearances, sponsorship, endorsement or merchandising unless this is provably not an arrangement involving the club.

  • This latter one specifically addresses some of the Manchester City accusations whereby players remuneration was allegedly topped up by sponsors 'related' to the club.

  • So basically every player or former player on the financial books at any time during the period whether they have kicked a ball or not and any person who as acted as the primary coach of the club are included in the calculation.

    Anything else?

  • Any cost of intermediaries or connected party of any sort where it is not already covered in the relevant person's costs are also included.

  • That could be a legal entity where the relevant party has more than 20% beneficial ownership, an agent, wife, child, uncle's milkman.. literally any payment physical or otherwise to any party that has a connection with the relevant person during which time he is on the financial books of the club.

  • Amortisation and impairments in line with the club's accounting procedures must be used to reflect an appropriate portion of transfer fee - somewhere Chelsea have been 'clever' in putting players on 200 year deals, now proscribed by UEFA.

    Is there any offsetting available?

  • If the relevant person's tax liability exceeds UEFAs tax multiplier this can be discounted.

  • UEFAs tax multiplier is calculated every three years against the prevailing tax system in the top 5 UEFA member association countries and a relevant person's tax liability cannot exceed this multiplier. Where they do that excess cost is discounted.

    This sounds like an admin nightmare

  • It is, much more so than PSR, which for all its faults is a simple mechanism extracting from standard accounting procedures allowable expenses, revenues and pre-tax losses.

  • In effect with PSR clubs have to just produce accounts by the deadline and highlight the required elements for the Premier League to pass judgement on.

  • SCR however requires the club to collect, hold and disclose a granularity of data that would ordinarily be an input into rather than a published output under general accounting rules.

    So that's the Costs in squad cost rato, what's the other side?

  • A club's revenue or more accurately 'adjusted operating revenue' i.e. what UEFA wants to see not what the club necessarily publishes in their accounts

  • Again UEFA have been very prescriptive in what they term adjusted operating revenue.

  • Adjusted operating revenue is not as simple as taking the published revenue of the club from the company accounts.

    How is the adjusted operating revenue calculated?

  • Gate receipts

  • Sponsorship and advertising income

  • Broadcasting rights income

  • Commercial income (net of costs of merchandise)

  • UEFA solidarity income

  • UEFA prize income

  • Any other operating income for non-footballing activities

    But can't clubs just make it up... mentioning no names?

  • All of the above are subject to UEFA's fair value calculation.

  • Where overstatements are found, anything exceeding the fair value calculation will be adjusted down accordingly

  • Any operating income for non-footballing activities that has no connection to the club will also be removed

  • Any exceptional items are inadmissable so the sudden income injection from the rich benefactor, sale of hotels to your sister company and flogging your women's team to the Chairman's wife will be out of the calculation

  • We need to see if those exceptional items really will be excluded and how that stands up to the inevitable legal challenge.

    Anything else?

  • Clubs need to factor in any net profit or loss on the disposal of any relevant persons registration i.e. did they sell the player at a loss or profit

  • This however is treated differently from all the other inputs to the squad cost ratio as the total net profit or loss on player sales is calculated across the previous three years and pro-rated to the 12 months.

    • Net profit or loss on disposal of relevant persons’ registrations must be recognised

    • the 36 months to the 31 December during the licence season, prorated to 12 months, for element v) above.

  • On the face of it this would seem to undermine the idea of a true 12 month picture whilst also raising questions of whether clubs, not active in Europe throughout that three year period, should have to submit for the periods they were not in European competition.

  • There is also a hoover up mechanism that catches those transactions, costs and income outside of the capitalisation and amortisation method of accounting

    So then what happens?

  • UEFA take their 'squad cost' number and divide it into their 'adjusted operating revenue' number and produce a percentage.

  • That percentage needs to be below the figure defined in Article 94 set at 70%

    70%? That's not what I've read?

  • To confuse matters, prior to the imposition of the new rules, UEFA released a statement suggesting that: 

    • "The gradual implementation will see the percentage at 90% in 2023/2024, 80% in 2024/2025, and 70% in 2025/2026)"

  • However since the advent of the new rules Article 94 has always expressed the limit at 70%, to support this the figure has been consistent across the three issuances of the UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Sustainability Regulations since its introduction, with the documents published in January 2023 and July 2023 together with the current version dated June 2024 all referencing 70%.

  • Both may be true but it is unusual to not see an appendix table setting out the tapering within the first three years of operation and to have no reference whatsoever to this leeway anywhere in the regulations.

  • That's not the only thing that the press statement suggests to be true but which is not reflected in the regulation.

  • The statement suggests that the reference periods relate to football seasons (in 2023/2024, 80% in 2024/2025...) however the regulations in Article 92.04 state:

    • The relevant periods for the calculation of the squad cost ratio are:

    • the 12-month period to the 31 December during the licence season for elements i) to iv) above

  • Ultimately none of this may matter and the taper might be as written and the regulations operate exactly as they are written but it's less than helpful for UEFAs flagship cost control measure to be so poorly collated, intepreted and reported by UEFA themselves.

    OK is your rant over? So let's assume it is 70%. if you've broken that limit what happens?

  • UEFA will pursue a 'financial disciplinary measure' against any errant club

  • That measure will be dependent on:

  • a) how much the club is over the threshold and

  • b) how many times the club has been over the threshold and by how much over the three preceding periods

    What is the 'financial disciplinary measure'?

  • This is where things get a little murky,

  • ​Having been very prescriptive to this point UEFA are a little more opaque when it comes to how and who they will find culpable.

  • They do provide some guidelines but within these guidelines there is significant scope for manoeuvre by UEFA.

  • The breaching club is not 'fined' a sum of money, rather any punishment will see UEFA solidarity payments and prize money otherwise due to the club being witheld equivalent to the value of the 'fine'.

  • The punishment therefore isn't a cost, it's a reduction in revenue and that is highly controversial as it has a direct impact on PSR.

  • Only if the punishment exceeds the sum of money due from UEFA for a club's competition participation will a fine become payable and a cost incurred by the club.

  • The timescales for that to crystallise however are not prescribed so it could be an immediate excess fine or one five years down the line.

  • And that's not the end of the rather uncertain processes following SCR calculation.

  • Technically, under the rules, UEFA could decide arbritrarily whether they want to punish a club or not.

  • They could also choose a different financial disciplinary measure to be imposed from a fairly wide spread from club to club even if it's for the same offence.

  • In an effort to bring some sort of hierarchy of offence, UEFA have created the concept of a significant breach
     

  • So what would be defined as a significant breach?

  • UEFA define a signficant breach as a first time offending club being more than 20% above the threshold, so an SCR of more than 90%

  • Or a club being more than 10% above the threshold, so an SCR of more than 80% but where the club also failed SCR once in the previous three seasons.

  • Or a club being above the threshold, so an SCR of more than 70% but where the club has failed SCR twice or more in the previous three seasons.

    What are the punishments for a significant breach?

  • This is where things get very weird.

  • Despite the concept of a significant breach being a cornerstone of UEFA's punishment regime there is no separate or defined punishment mechanism to deal with significant breaches,

  • Rather there is simply a sliding scale of breaches driven by the number of percentage points above the 70% limit and the number of breaches committed in the previous three seasons.

  • Quite why UEFA haven't carried through the concept of significant breach into their financial disciplinary measure grid is unclear but the lack of it certainly undermines its claimed importance.

  • The punishments are defined in the financial disciplinary measure grid (see below)

  • Concerningly, the financial disciplinary measure grid begins with as little a breach of more than 0% over 70% for a first offender - hardly something you would expect to be termed 'significant breach'.
     

  • How much are we talking here?

  • For a first time breacher, with a SCR of 70.1%, UEFA 'reserve the right' to withhold between 10% and 25% of solidarity payments and prize money that would otherwise have fallen due.

  • Not only is that a tiny tolerance to the limit, the punishment itself contains a massive spread. 

  • For comparison there is an unwritten leeway with PSR that allows the £105m threshold to be exceeded by 10% or more without action.

  • That is a massive spread and worryingly suggests UEFA can choose their punishment on a subjective rather than objective basis.

  • This is especially the case given UEFAs wording in L.3.3 that they will simply "take into consideration the table" when deciding punishment for a club deemed in breach.

  • This lack of granularity in breach / punishment combinations is the driving force behind the concerns of many participant clubs.

Can clubs not forecast all this and act accordingly?

  • Of course clubs can, and will, forecast within an inch of their lives what their output SCR will be but they cannot know for certain.

  • To a greater degree clubs are in control of PSR, they know the numbers they are being judged against well in advance of submission, and in truth are fully aware that any questionable items or ommissions will be swfitly thrown out.

  • SCR is very different, although UEFA clearly lay out what can be included, it is for UEFA to decide categorisation and compliance. Under PSR it is simply the allowable expenses, none of which contribute to SCR, that are under scrutiny.

  • As a result clubs are left guessing:

  • a) what UEFA will decide to include in squad costs?

  • b) what UEFA will decide to include in adjusted operational revenue?

  • c) will UEFA will act at all? is 0.1% over really a breach?

  • d) if they do act how material will the punishment be? Are four lots of 0.1% breaches (75%-100% punishment) really worse than one 25% breach (50%-75% punishment)?

    So where are Villa in all this?

  • Just as Villa could not account for guaranteed Champions League income in 2023-24 which forced the sale of Douglas Luiz, so Villa, as a historically regular, but recent non-participant in European competition means they do not receive the benefit of enhanced solidarity payments.

  • That leads them exposed to a new FFP methodology through no fault of their own once again.

  • As a 'new' entrant Villa will have their SCR based on non-European revenues as opposed to the likes of Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool and Manchester City who will benefit from multiple year compound increases in UEFA solidarity payments.

  • Clearly you could legitimately argue that is tough luck on Villa as they were not  'good' enough to qualify for European competition before but to say that is an oversimplification of an issue would be a massive understatement.

  • In a perverse way however that's what UEFA want: to push out clubs they view as financially unstable and if they happen to be (likely to be) 'newcomers' who do not have the legacy European solidarity payments to keep them well below the SCR threshold then so be it.

  • They after all are not as 'valuable' to the UEFA 'family' as legacy clubs.

  • Harsh but through policies of UEFAs own making, very true.

  • The dictionary definition of a closed shop.

  • As it is currently worded SCR is designed to, and in all liklihood will, stifle any new competition whilst continuing to pump money into some of the least financially stable clubs in European football where brand equity carries more weight than fair competition.

  • The supreme irony is that UEFA have positively encouraged over-spending as a hallmark of European competition with the likes of Barcelona, Real Madrid, Chelsea and Manchester City seemingly having pulled every trick in the book to keep their insatiable spending going whilst the likes of Manchester United have simply overspent with just their brand value keeping their head above water.

  • SCR does nothing to stop this continuing.
     

  • But haven't Villa have spent wildly on wages and done nothing about it?

  • Villa's 2023-24 accounts reported a 91% wage to revenue figure.

  • Clearly that puts Villa straight in the 'significant breach' category that would attract a 50% to 75% financial punishment (it's that huge spread again) even for a first offender.

  • However the 91% is wide of the mark for three reasons:

  • Firstly we know that Villa's 2023-24 accounts were for a 13 month period and when restated to 12 months would have delivered a c82% wage to revenue figure (on a pure pro rata basis) (just the 25-50% punishment to swallow there then).

  • Secondly the wage to revenue figure from Villa's account is NOT the same as the SCR that will ultimately be output from UEFA.

  • Thirdly, SCR is calculated over the calendar year and will therefore capture a completely different set of financial information than the 2023-24 accounts.

  • SCR could be more, it could be less, more costs could be included, less income could be recognised or vice versa.

  • Disappointingly even the football finance experts are using the 2023-24 wages over revenue number as a proxy for SCR but as you can see above it isn't anywhere near as straightforward.

  • And therein lies the fundamental problem, Villa are having to look at things from an accounting perspective while knowing UEFA will, for want of a better phrase, be picking and choosing their inputs to deliver their output.

  • One major risk to Villa is the 'swap' deals seen in the summer of 2024 when, although days apart, players such as Tim Iroegbunam and Lewis Dobbin moved in opposite directions for similar fees.

  • This was fully PSR compliant but UEFA do not like this, it's not clear how they would treat these or what detrimental impact it could have on SCR - Villa can hardly be expected to account for both players and the net profit / loss impact is negligible - but it is an illustrative point in how much SCR and PSR can diverge.

  • In Villa's specific case the club and 'brand' have been severely under exploited over decades leading to a revenue level that pales against their contemporaries in the Premier League.

  • Villa adopted a strategy of PSR compliance which they have largely achieved save for the unfortunate timing, and somewhat unrelated, sale of Douglas Luiz last summer.

  • Villa having managed PSR well, whilst still performing on the pitch at levels not seen for decades, have achieved relative success where others, spending significanly more, have not.

  • SCR however is a different metric to PSR and throws in some new hurdles, none of which are legitimate signifiers of financial instability, but which nevertheless force Villa to be in compliance.

  • Although SCR and PSR do not entirely contradict each other neither do they work in tandem, so an action taken under PSR is not necessarily a benefit to SCR and vice versa.

  • Villa have however been prudent in managing SCR for instance through the sale of Moussa Diaby which had minimal PSR benefit but significant SCR impact in taking a high earner off the books.

  • Where things start to go awry however is where PSR operates in such a way that it makes SCR non-compliance more likely.

  • Villa, who are on a steep revenue growth path are effectively being prevented from exploiting their true financial capabilities through PSR which in turns means their record (but still subdued) revenue levels are deemed to potentially be insufficient to support compliance with SCR.

  • The fact that Villa could support manifold increases in spending is irrelevant, as is the fact that a European titan like Barcelona are walking a tightrope of financial instabiity everyday, unable to pay players, yet remain feted royalty in European competition.

  • As a result the Premier League (PSR) and UEFA (SCR) are compounding a problem of their own making whilst not addressing the real unsustainable spending.

    What's going to happen then?

  • Assuming UEFA work to the letter of the regulations, the SCR threshold will be 70% for 2024 (80% in parentheses).

  • It's likely that Villa will have exceeded the SCR 70% threshold in 2024.

  • We don't know by how much for the reasons stated above but let's assume it is 82%.

  • A 12 percentage point breach for a first offender would attract a punishment of between 25% and 50% (2 percentage points = 10% to 25%)

  • That punishment would be applied to all Villa's UEFA solidarity and prize money earned during 2024 when they played six Europa Conference League games against Ajax, Lille and Olympiacos reaching the semi final before they played six Champions League games against Young Boys, Bayern, Bologna, Brugges, Juventus and Leipzig in the group stages.

  • Villa earnt £71m from the Champions League after reaching the Quarter Finals in 2024-25 but the majority of that will have been generated in 2025 whilst the Conference League will have attracted a far lower sum of money.

  • Assuming though that Villa earnt £40m from UEFA in 2024 they could face a punishment of £20m (£10m), all of which would have to come off the still to be produced 2024-25 accounts.

  • In this example Villa would only be able to collect, and recognise £51m (£61m) of the £71m of Champions League prize money in the 2024-25 accounts.

  • That would mean an expected turnover of £350m would drop to £330m (£340m)

  • And an expected PSR headroom for 2024-25 of £20m would be entirely wiped out (reduced to £10m)

    What can Villa do?

  • Well Villa must surely be lobbying for a derogation as 2024 will be their first full calendar year in Europe​ under any sort of Financial Fair Play regime.

  • That would appear sensible and prudent for UEFA to legitimately recognise.

  • Not to give Villa special treatment but to recognise that such a move would reflect the basis upon which SCR is predicated.

  • SCR works on a current calendar year and three previous calendar year basis to define a significant breach.

  • As a consequence it would be perfectly logical to require that clubs would need to have been participants in European competition for at least three calendar years before a breach can reasonably be met with punishment under SCR.

  • Punishment(s) could even be suspended until such a probation period was completed.

  • One way or another Villa need to avoid any punishment that could have a catalytic impact on PSR which remains the biggest constraint on Villa's ambitions.

  • Watch this space.

Fun reading ⤵️

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